guets nois jedenfalls!
2009-12-31
2009-12-29
Wie grün sind seine Blätter!
Auf den norwegischen Nordmann haben wir verzichtet -- obwohl der noch viel schöner gewesen wäre!
2009-12-27
2009-12-26
2009-12-25
2009-12-14
2009-12-02
Neulich, in der Farmafirma
(Genützt hats leider doch nicht viel, jemand hat sich trotzdem mit einem Fussabdruck verewigt.)
2009-11-29
2009-11-02
einfach mal spinnen
gestern abend, bei meinem abendlichen spaziergang, hatte ich einen zen-moment. Als ich ein spinnennetz vor einer Strassenlampe sah, war ich ergriffen von der schönheit der natur. Und ihrer kreaturen. Und ihrer spinnennetze, natürlich. Dann kamen mir aber sogleich zweifel: ist das richtig so? sollte man ein spinnennetz sehen? ich denke, als fliege oder motte oder nachtfalter würde ich mir lieber früher als später eine andere lampe aussuchen. Das wiederum führte dann zur erkenntnis, dass es sich mit netzen spinnen wohl so verhält wie mit bilder aufhängen: man kann nicht gleichzeitig an etwasem arbeiten und kontrollieren dass es grad hängt, äh: richtig gemacht ist. und dann hab ich mich auch gefragt, ob so eine spinne überhaupt gross aus ihrem netz rauskommt um ihre arbeit zu begutachten, oder ob spinnen tendenziell eher gemütlich zuhause bleiben und fernsehn schauen, bis wieder was hängengeblieben ist?
an der nächsten lampe habe ich zwei netze gesehen: vielleicht ein spinnenpärchen: frisch zusammengekommen, aber den schritt zum gemeinsamen netz noch nicht gewagt! die werden sich sicher irgendwie abgesprochen haben.
spinne A: warte! ich habe eine todsicheren plan: wir machen ein spinnennetz vor das licht! fliegen fliegen ums licht! wir fangen fliegen mit spinnennetzen! spinnennetz vor licht fängt fliegen! ein todsicherer plan!
spinne B: ich weiss nicht. vor dem licht tönt irgendwie komisch - heisst das nicht, dass wir total beleuchtet sind? sehen uns dann nicht alle?
A: hmmmmm. aber sidney, der sohn eines cousins meiner mutter..
B: wer ist das?
A: also, meine mutter, ja, ich hab eine mutter, du hast auch eine! meine mutter hat einen cousin, der wiederum hat einen sohn. der heisst sidney!
B: Sidney? was für ein hirnrissiger name. kommt er aus australien?
A: nein, kommt auch nicht drauf an. sidney hat auch ein netz vor einer lampe, und er lebt wie die legendäre dicke spinne im netz.
B: aber ist sidneys lampe an?
A: öh... ja, wohl schon.
B: aber sieht man dann das netz nicht?
A: öh... nein, ich denke nicht, sonst würden ja nicht so viele fliegen reinfliegen.
B: hast du sidney mal gefragt, ob sie in australien überhaupt die lampen anzünden? vielleicht hat er ein netz vor einer lampe, die gar nicht brennt? vielleicht fliegen die fliegen einfach sonst so rein, weil australische fliegen machen das so?
A: ich hab ihn nicht gefragt, weil ich kenn ihn gar nicht - meine mutter kennt ihn. und sidney ist nicht australier! und sie hätte mir doch nicht eine geschichte von einer spinne vor einer dunklen lampe erzählt!
B: naja... sie hat dir auch erzählt, dass skorpione spinnen sind...
A: skorpione SIND spinnentiere! lass meine mutter aus dem spiel! jedenfalls, ich bau jetzt hier ein netz und du machst was du willst! so ein netz ist ja nicht die welt, wir brauchen ja keine hypothek oder handwerker, oke!?! wenns nicht klappt versuchen wirs wieder vor einem busch!
B: also, also, von mir aus. dann halt! ein netz vor einer lampe. vielleicht können wir die weihnachtsbeleuchtung auch schon dranhägen. oder stoppschilder vorne hinstellen...
A: während du noch maulst, ist meins schon fertig! da! war das jetzt so ein aufwand?
B: ich sehs aber.
A: du bist auch eine spinne.
B: die anderen sehens aber auch.
A: wie willst du das wissen? die sehens sicher nicht, ich meine ich seh ja auch nicht ob ich amigs ein fliegerich oder eine fliegin fresse, das ist ein fliegending. und spinnennetze sind ein spinnending.
B: und ich sag dir man siehts! mach sechzehn schritte zurück und sieh selbst wie dus siehst!
A: ich muss keine schritte machen! man siehts nicht! basta!
B: so, meins ist auch fertig. aber das wird nix. das kann ich dir grad schon sagen. das wird nix. eine fliege fliegt nicht in ein sichtbares spinnennetz. das ist voll blöd.
A: who's the bigger fool...
B: ach, weisst du was: frag doch deine mutter und ihre australischen skorpione. ich hab genug! ich haus!
A: ja, geh doch! dann hab ich zwei netze. ich werd leben wie eine dicke spinne in ZWEI netzen! eat this, sidney!
2009-10-31
2009-10-30
2009-10-29
2009-10-18
step in to the arena
lass mich damit anfangen, dass ich froh bin, kein kind mehr zu sein. wir waren wiedermal im GZ heuried, und dort war grad multi-way-match , äh: freies spielen.
ich erinnere mich noch allzu gut, wie ich als kind in solchen momenten total überfordert war: das spielgerät meiner wahl war nicht frei, fragen obs frei wird hab ich mich nie getraut und wenns dann endlich frei wurde, war garantiert immer jemand schneller als ich dort. gesetzt den fall ich hatte aus wunderlichen gründen das spielzeug meiner begierde, kam garantiert irgendein giftzwerg der es mir ohne lange zu diskutieren einfach wegnahm. meine mutter oder mein grossvater waren in solchen fällen keine grosse hilfe, denn die gaben mir höchstens zu verstehen, der giftzwerg sein ein vielfaches kleiner als ich, ich solle selber das problem lösen. Nun, das problem löste ich normalerweise auf chinesische art, denn wie jeder chinese so schön weiss: von den 36 strategemen ist weglaufen die beste methode. Giftzwerge, wie jeder weiss, können recht stark sein, und ausserdem tendieren sie aussergewöhnlich motiviert zu sein, weil dem langen lulatsch werde ich es jetzt mal ordentlich zeigen und so.
wann ich gelernt habe mich durchzusetzen ist mir schleierhaft, aber irgendwann muss es mal einen knopf gelöst haben. ich mach mir deshalb auch keine allzu grossen sorgen um meine lieblingstochter, auch wenn sie eine grosse anhängerin chinesischer philosophie zu sein scheint.
die kampfzone hat sich aber auch merklich verändert (um nicht zu sagen: verhärtet) seit meiner jugend... ich meine: in meiner jugend war ich der ausländer, aber hier! ich schwöremann! hier im GZ ist ja schlimmer als in wallisellen. unsere tochter war im babyschwimmen, aber diese kinder sind alle ins baby-kickboxen gegangen, glaubs. gegen solche rüpel ist kein kraut gewachsen. natürlich muss man da als papi manchmal einschreiten, und seiner tochter zu ihrem recht zu verhelfen. ausser die papis von ahmed und branko sind auch da. dann tut man gut daran sich an das alte chinesische sprichwort zu erinnern: von den 36 strategemen, na... du kennst den rest.
jedenfalls bin ich froh, kein kind mehr zu sein.
2009-10-14
neues zum large hadron collider
das letzte gerücht: leute aus der zukunft sabotieren das projekt:
"The quest to observe the Higgs boson has certainly been plagued by its share of troubles, from the cancellation of the Superconducting Supercollider in 1993 to the Large Hadron Collider's streak of technical troubles. In fact, the projects have suffered such bad luck that Holger Bech Nielsen of the Niels Bohr Institute in Copenhagen and Masao Ninomiya of the Yukawa Institute for Theoretical Physics in Kyoto wonder if it isn't bad luck at all, but future influences rippling back to sabotage them."
LINK zu io9
"The quest to observe the Higgs boson has certainly been plagued by its share of troubles, from the cancellation of the Superconducting Supercollider in 1993 to the Large Hadron Collider's streak of technical troubles. In fact, the projects have suffered such bad luck that Holger Bech Nielsen of the Niels Bohr Institute in Copenhagen and Masao Ninomiya of the Yukawa Institute for Theoretical Physics in Kyoto wonder if it isn't bad luck at all, but future influences rippling back to sabotage them."
LINK zu io9
2009-10-13
Lightsaber
2009-10-12
must-read zu iran
must-read der woche! der beste artikel zur situation mit dem iran - im newsweek, von Fareed Zakaria:
"[...] The country has a right to civilian nuclear energy, as do all nations. But Tehran has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA says Iran has exhibited a pattern of deception and non-cooperation involving its nuclear program for 20 years—including lying about its activities and concealing sites. In that context, it makes sense to be suspicious of Iran's intentions and to ask that the IAEA routinely verify and inspect its facilities. Unless that can be achieved, Iran should pay the price for its actions. Washington's current strategy is to muster international support to impose greater costs, while at the same time negotiating with Iran to find a solution that gives the world greater assurance that the Iranian program is purely civilian in nature. [...]
One way to get instant gratification would be military force. The United States or Israel could attack Iran from the air. To be effective, such an attack would have to be large-scale and sustained, probably involving dozens and dozens of sorties over several days. The campaign would need to strike at all known Iranian facilities as well as suspected ones. Such an attack would probably not get at everything. Iran's sites are buried in mountains, and there are surely some facilities that we do not know about. But it would deal a massive blow to the Iranian nuclear program.
The first thing that would happen the day after such an offensive begins would be a massive outpouring of support for the Iranian regime. This happens routinely when a country is attacked by foreign forces, no matter how unpopular the government. ... The Iranian regime itself was in deep trouble in 1980, facing internal dissension and mass dissatisfaction, when Saddam Hussein attacked, throwing a lifeline to the mullahs. ... The -Iranian dissident Ali Akbar Mousavi Khoeini said to me, "If there were an attack, all of us would have to come out the next day and support the government. It would be the worst scenario for the opposition."
[...] The gain from an attack, on the other hand, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates points out, would be to delay, not end, the Iranian program, perhaps by a few years but no more. The regime has oil money, and with heightened national support and resolve, it could quickly rebuild most of its facilities. That's why the military option is just not worth the costs. And pretending that we are going to attack, when it is not a real option, is a hollow threat. You can posture as a columnist but not as the president of the United States.
There is an entirely different approach that some have advocated for a while. This strategy—engagement—is rooted in the belief that the United States has never really understood Iran's concerns and never negotiated in good faith with the regime. It argues that Iranians have legitimate security fears: there are tens of thousands of U.S. troops on either side of its border; Washington makes no secret of its desire for regime change; the CIA funds groups seeking to overthrow the government; and so on. When Iran has made gestures, such as suspending nuclear enrichment for two years, Washington has not reciprocated. American support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War remains a source of justifiable bitterness among Iran's leaders, many of whom fought in that conflict. [...]
There is something to this line of thinking. The Iranians do have some legitimate security concerns. They live in a neighborhood surrounded by nuclear powers—Israel, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. The Bush administration did needlessly alienate Iran right after Tehran had cooperated with Washington to oust the Taliban and set up the Karzai government in Kabul. And it ignored any gestures or concessions made by the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami, further undermining an already weak president.
But the fundamental analysis is flawed. I do not believe the Iranian regime, at its core, wants normalized relations with America. Isolation from the West and hostility toward the United States are fundamental pillars that prop up the current regime—the reason that this system of government came into being and what sustains it every day. This is not simply a matter of ideology— though that is important—but economics. Those who rule in Tehran have created a closed, oligarchic economy that channels the country's oil revenues into the coffers of its religious foundations (for compliant clerics) and the increasingly powerful Revolutionary Guard. They benefit from a closed economy that they can manipulate. [...]
The United States has apologized for its role in the 1953 coup; it has reached out to Iran; it has offered wide-open talks. Each time, Iran has rebuffed the outstretched hand, claiming that the timing was bad, or the words used were wrong, or the offer wasn't big enough. If it is true that Washington has been wary of simply getting into talks with Tehran, the reverse is more evidently true. And until the government of Iran makes a decision that it is interested in a rapprochement, no set of words or gestures, however clever, is going to break the logjam.
So what does that leave? In fact, we are already moving toward a robust, workable response to the dangers of an Iranian nuclear program—one that involves sustained containment and deterrence. Iran's rise has aroused suspicion in the Arab world. Many countries in the region are developing closer ties with the United States, including military ones. In the West, European nations worry about nuclear proliferation and are irritated with Iran's deception and obstructionism. They have gotten tougher over the years in combating Iran and its proxies, and they are getting tougher at implementing some of the financial sanctions that target Iran's elites. Even Russia and China, which have tried to maintain their ties with Iran, are conscious that they cannot be seen to be utterly unconcerned about proliferation and the defiance of U.N. resolutions. So they've allowed for some actions against the Iranian regime (and according to some reports were critical to the outcome of last week's talks in Geneva).
All this means that Iran has become something of an international pariah, unable to operate with great latitude around the world. The country is in a box and, if well handled, can be kept there until the regime becomes much more transparent and cooperative on the nuclear issue. To do so, we should maintain the current sanctions but should not add broad new ones like an embargo on refined-gasoline imports. Any new measures should target the leadership and factions like the Revolutionary Guards specifically. And we should think more broadly about other ways to pressure the regime. There should be a structure within which those countries that are worried about the threat posed by Iran can meet and strategize. We should work to further align the interests of moderate Arab states with those of Israel, which could be one of the strategic boons of the circumstance. It's clear that Iran fears this potential alliance, which is why Ahmadinejad has worked so hard to present himself as the chief spokesman for the great Arab cause of Palestine. By spouting his nonsense about the Holocaust and professing his support for the Palestinians, he's trying to make it harder for leaders in Saudi Arabia to effectively take Israel's side in opposition to Tehran.
At the same time, we must stop exaggerating the Iranian threat. By hyping it, we only provide Iran with "free power," in Leslie Gelb's apt phrase. This is an insecure Third World country with a GDP that is one 40th the size of America's, a dysfunctional economy, a divided political class, and a government facing mass unrest at home. It has alienated most of its neighboring states and cuts a sorry figure on the world stage, with an international embarrassment for a president. Its forays in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza have had mixed results, with the locals often growing weary of the Iranian thugs who try to control them.
The country does not yet have even one nuclear weapon, and if and when it gets one—something that is far from certain—the world will not end. The Middle East has been home to nuclear weapons for decades. If Israel's estimated -arsenal of 200 warheads, including a "second-strike capacity," has not prompted Egypt to develop its own nukes, it's not clear that one Iranian bomb would do so. (Recall that Egypt has fought and lost three wars against Israel, so it should be far more concerned about an Israeli bomb than an Iranian one.) More crucially, Israel's massive nuclear force will deter Iran from ever contemplating using or giving away its own (hypothetical) weapon. Deterrence worked with madmen like Mao, and with thugs like Stalin, and it will work with the calculating autocrats of Tehran. The Iranian regime has amply demonstrated over the past four months that it is interested in hanging on to power at all costs, jailing mullahs and ignoring its own clerical elite. These are not the actions of religious rulers about to commit mass suicide.
We should not fear to negotiate with these rulers. We talked to the Soviet Union even as we implemented a far more extensive policy of containment toward Moscow. But talks should not involve a final normalization or sanctification of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unless there is a Gorbachev-like reversal of Iran's basic approach to the world—a Persian glasnost and perestroika—there should be no reciprocal integration into the Western world. [...]"
"[...] The country has a right to civilian nuclear energy, as do all nations. But Tehran has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, submitting itself to the jurisdiction of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA says Iran has exhibited a pattern of deception and non-cooperation involving its nuclear program for 20 years—including lying about its activities and concealing sites. In that context, it makes sense to be suspicious of Iran's intentions and to ask that the IAEA routinely verify and inspect its facilities. Unless that can be achieved, Iran should pay the price for its actions. Washington's current strategy is to muster international support to impose greater costs, while at the same time negotiating with Iran to find a solution that gives the world greater assurance that the Iranian program is purely civilian in nature. [...]
One way to get instant gratification would be military force. The United States or Israel could attack Iran from the air. To be effective, such an attack would have to be large-scale and sustained, probably involving dozens and dozens of sorties over several days. The campaign would need to strike at all known Iranian facilities as well as suspected ones. Such an attack would probably not get at everything. Iran's sites are buried in mountains, and there are surely some facilities that we do not know about. But it would deal a massive blow to the Iranian nuclear program.
The first thing that would happen the day after such an offensive begins would be a massive outpouring of support for the Iranian regime. This happens routinely when a country is attacked by foreign forces, no matter how unpopular the government. ... The Iranian regime itself was in deep trouble in 1980, facing internal dissension and mass dissatisfaction, when Saddam Hussein attacked, throwing a lifeline to the mullahs. ... The -Iranian dissident Ali Akbar Mousavi Khoeini said to me, "If there were an attack, all of us would have to come out the next day and support the government. It would be the worst scenario for the opposition."
[...] The gain from an attack, on the other hand, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates points out, would be to delay, not end, the Iranian program, perhaps by a few years but no more. The regime has oil money, and with heightened national support and resolve, it could quickly rebuild most of its facilities. That's why the military option is just not worth the costs. And pretending that we are going to attack, when it is not a real option, is a hollow threat. You can posture as a columnist but not as the president of the United States.
There is an entirely different approach that some have advocated for a while. This strategy—engagement—is rooted in the belief that the United States has never really understood Iran's concerns and never negotiated in good faith with the regime. It argues that Iranians have legitimate security fears: there are tens of thousands of U.S. troops on either side of its border; Washington makes no secret of its desire for regime change; the CIA funds groups seeking to overthrow the government; and so on. When Iran has made gestures, such as suspending nuclear enrichment for two years, Washington has not reciprocated. American support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War remains a source of justifiable bitterness among Iran's leaders, many of whom fought in that conflict. [...]
There is something to this line of thinking. The Iranians do have some legitimate security concerns. They live in a neighborhood surrounded by nuclear powers—Israel, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan. The Bush administration did needlessly alienate Iran right after Tehran had cooperated with Washington to oust the Taliban and set up the Karzai government in Kabul. And it ignored any gestures or concessions made by the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami, further undermining an already weak president.
But the fundamental analysis is flawed. I do not believe the Iranian regime, at its core, wants normalized relations with America. Isolation from the West and hostility toward the United States are fundamental pillars that prop up the current regime—the reason that this system of government came into being and what sustains it every day. This is not simply a matter of ideology— though that is important—but economics. Those who rule in Tehran have created a closed, oligarchic economy that channels the country's oil revenues into the coffers of its religious foundations (for compliant clerics) and the increasingly powerful Revolutionary Guard. They benefit from a closed economy that they can manipulate. [...]
The United States has apologized for its role in the 1953 coup; it has reached out to Iran; it has offered wide-open talks. Each time, Iran has rebuffed the outstretched hand, claiming that the timing was bad, or the words used were wrong, or the offer wasn't big enough. If it is true that Washington has been wary of simply getting into talks with Tehran, the reverse is more evidently true. And until the government of Iran makes a decision that it is interested in a rapprochement, no set of words or gestures, however clever, is going to break the logjam.
So what does that leave? In fact, we are already moving toward a robust, workable response to the dangers of an Iranian nuclear program—one that involves sustained containment and deterrence. Iran's rise has aroused suspicion in the Arab world. Many countries in the region are developing closer ties with the United States, including military ones. In the West, European nations worry about nuclear proliferation and are irritated with Iran's deception and obstructionism. They have gotten tougher over the years in combating Iran and its proxies, and they are getting tougher at implementing some of the financial sanctions that target Iran's elites. Even Russia and China, which have tried to maintain their ties with Iran, are conscious that they cannot be seen to be utterly unconcerned about proliferation and the defiance of U.N. resolutions. So they've allowed for some actions against the Iranian regime (and according to some reports were critical to the outcome of last week's talks in Geneva).
All this means that Iran has become something of an international pariah, unable to operate with great latitude around the world. The country is in a box and, if well handled, can be kept there until the regime becomes much more transparent and cooperative on the nuclear issue. To do so, we should maintain the current sanctions but should not add broad new ones like an embargo on refined-gasoline imports. Any new measures should target the leadership and factions like the Revolutionary Guards specifically. And we should think more broadly about other ways to pressure the regime. There should be a structure within which those countries that are worried about the threat posed by Iran can meet and strategize. We should work to further align the interests of moderate Arab states with those of Israel, which could be one of the strategic boons of the circumstance. It's clear that Iran fears this potential alliance, which is why Ahmadinejad has worked so hard to present himself as the chief spokesman for the great Arab cause of Palestine. By spouting his nonsense about the Holocaust and professing his support for the Palestinians, he's trying to make it harder for leaders in Saudi Arabia to effectively take Israel's side in opposition to Tehran.
At the same time, we must stop exaggerating the Iranian threat. By hyping it, we only provide Iran with "free power," in Leslie Gelb's apt phrase. This is an insecure Third World country with a GDP that is one 40th the size of America's, a dysfunctional economy, a divided political class, and a government facing mass unrest at home. It has alienated most of its neighboring states and cuts a sorry figure on the world stage, with an international embarrassment for a president. Its forays in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza have had mixed results, with the locals often growing weary of the Iranian thugs who try to control them.
The country does not yet have even one nuclear weapon, and if and when it gets one—something that is far from certain—the world will not end. The Middle East has been home to nuclear weapons for decades. If Israel's estimated -arsenal of 200 warheads, including a "second-strike capacity," has not prompted Egypt to develop its own nukes, it's not clear that one Iranian bomb would do so. (Recall that Egypt has fought and lost three wars against Israel, so it should be far more concerned about an Israeli bomb than an Iranian one.) More crucially, Israel's massive nuclear force will deter Iran from ever contemplating using or giving away its own (hypothetical) weapon. Deterrence worked with madmen like Mao, and with thugs like Stalin, and it will work with the calculating autocrats of Tehran. The Iranian regime has amply demonstrated over the past four months that it is interested in hanging on to power at all costs, jailing mullahs and ignoring its own clerical elite. These are not the actions of religious rulers about to commit mass suicide.
We should not fear to negotiate with these rulers. We talked to the Soviet Union even as we implemented a far more extensive policy of containment toward Moscow. But talks should not involve a final normalization or sanctification of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Unless there is a Gorbachev-like reversal of Iran's basic approach to the world—a Persian glasnost and perestroika—there should be no reciprocal integration into the Western world. [...]"
ich kenn jemand, der kennt jemand...
...cousin vinnie, natürlich, dann aber auch big-joe und natürlich cigar-mike... und was soll ich sagen, sie können dir vielleicht helfen, weisst du...
2009-10-11
2009-10-06
es gibt sie noch: kiddierides für -.20
in der migi bei uns.
2009-09-17
2009-09-15
felix turicum II - konzis
raketen fliegen
fische angeln
bahnen fahren.und natürlich zuviel süssigkeiten gegessen.
ab zwei kindern kann man anfangen zu vergleichen
in den wochen grad nach der geburt....
...und nach vier monaten.
2009-09-07
sneakpeek vom höfliweg
grundriss
hier der stand vom sonntag: oben sind wir schon angeschrieben,und unten sieht man wie die küche und wohnstube von aussen ausschauen...
mehr morgen...
meine lieblingstochter
immer wenn ich nicht so zum schreiben komme, mache ich foto-ecken-installationen... schon so.aber mir gefällt die kombination von strumpfi, röckli und rüstung halt trotzdem extrem.
ab nach libyen
herr burkhalter meinte scheints gemäss AZ gemäss Tribune: "Ende Mai erklärte der freisinnge Kronfavorit für den Bundesrat in der Westschweizer Zeitung «Tribune de Genève», dass «die Soldaten des Aufklärungsdetachements 10 absolut fähig sind (...) in Libyen zu intervenieren». Die Elitetruppe (AAD 10) könnte dazu dienen, die zwei in Libyen zurückgehaltenen Schweizer zu befreien: «Die Soldaten sind sehr gut ausgebildet und gut ausgerüstet für Befreiungsaktionen»."
ich weiss gar nicht, wo ich unsere swiss-navy-seals lieber im einsatz hätte: am horn von afrika oder in libyen.
aber wenn das erste nicht klappt wegen diesem laaaangweiligem parlament, dann können sie sicher nach libyen, weil das fällt sicher unter ihren auftrag. ich hab jedenfalls während meiner aktivzeit (als ich aktiv psp spielte) beide missionen erfolgreich erfüllt, macht beides spass! muss ja nicht immer gleich so trostlos enden...
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